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VIOLENCE AND LAW’S LIMITS 
Julie Novkov 
ERIC M. FREEDMAN, MAKING HABEAS WORK: A LEGAL HISTORY (NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018). PP. 208. HARDCOVER $45. 
 
BETH LEW-WILLIAMS, THE CHINESE MUST GO: VIOLENCE, EXCLUSION, AND THE 
MAKING OF THE ALIEN IN AMERICA (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018). 
PP. 360. HARDCOVER $39.95. 
In 1986, Robert Cover’s germinal essay “Violence and the Word” laid out his theory 
that “legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.”1 From questions of 
constitutional interpretation to everyday civil disputes, legal interpretation carries “the 
seeds of violence” because of its connection to the institutional capacity to exercise power 
legitimately.  Two recently published books, Eric Freedman’s volume on habeas corpus 
and Betty Lew-Williams’ history of Chinese exclusion, provide accounts that enrich our 
understanding of the relationship between law and violence. Freedman considers how and 
when law may be interposed to short-circuit state violence through judges’ capacity to 
remove individuals from state custody,2 and Lew-Williams explains how extra-legal 
violence can generate conditions that provoke the development of new, legitimated 
institutional violence.3 In both instances, however, state actors’ interest in exercising 
violently coercive authority proved to be only partially containable through law. 
Furthermore, when judicial authorities step back from reviewing the legitimacy of state 
action, their deference often implies the appropriate exercise of state power – or at least 
that some practices of state violence are not subject to independent oversight. 
Eric Freedman interweaves an analysis of recent federal cases involving habeas 
corpus with the early American history of legal interventions to rescue individuals from 
the coercive power of the state.4 His primary aim is to show that the early history of the 
great writ should be reconfigured to incorporate cases that sought release from unlawful 
detention, even if they were not formally styled as habeas cases.5 This functional 
                                                          
 1. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986). 
 2. See ERIC M. FREEDMAN, MAKING HABEAS WORK: A LEGAL HISTORY (2016). 
 3. See BETH LEW-WILLIAMS, THE CHINESE MUST GO: VIOLENCE, EXCLUSION, AND THE MAKING OF THE 
ALIEN IN AMERICA (2018). 
 4. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 56–59. 
 5. See id. at 7–26. 
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definition, he claims, expands the scope of how we think about the courts’ role in curbing 
state power, providing to them a potent tool for reviewing state actions independently to 
determine whether they are justified.6 He recaptures a lost history of legal remedies that 
functioned to free aggrieved individuals from the state’s coercive power, whether 
exercised legislatively or by the executive.7 These remedies, in addition to providing 
judicial intervention to short circuit coercive state authority over the person, provided 
opportunities for the democratic check of juries as an additional safeguard. 
Freedman explains habeas as having two distinctive aspects: that of a specific legal 
remedy for state overreach, and as an important and inadequately recognized element of 
the foundational checks and balances established in the constitution.8 In the early history 
of the United States, he claims, habeas set the boundaries for governmental control over 
individuals.9 This power was not a broad limit on governmental authority, but it did 
provide the opportunity for individuals to challenge coercive action by the state that 
limited their freedom, and linked with other legal protections to form a “web of legal 
restraints on government misconduct.”10 The strands of this web, in addition to the 
foundation of habeas, included individuals’ capacity to sustain claims of false 
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, trespass, and related wrongs. While individual state 
agents were the primary targets of such claims, they nonetheless served to curb state 
authority over private individuals. 
Beginning in the colonial era, Freedman presents the early history of American 
courts’ actions to secure individuals’ protection from illegitimate state restraint 
comprehensively, explaining not only the opinions, but the circumstances of the litigants, 
derived from records. He argues that this richer history was lost and only recently and 
partially recovered with the Supreme Court’s 2008 ruling in Boumediene v. Bush. He 
places a significant portion of the blame on John Marshall, who, he argues, in maneuvering 
to protect the institutional space of the courts in the early republic, planted a dangerous 
“sea mine” under the broad and widely accepted scope of habeas that had prevailed in the 
pre-constitutional era.11 
As Freedman details, in the early 1800s, Marshall and his judicial colleagues were 
the sole remaining Federalist outpost standing against the wave of Jeffersonian 
transformation of the political branches.12 Scholars have discussed Marshall’s efforts to 
define and defend the Supreme Court’s power in Marbury v. Madison, but have attended 
less to the case of Erick Bollman, one of Aaron Burr’s co-conspirators. Rather than being 
arrested for attempting to seduce officials in the western territories into contemplating 
secession, Bollman was apprehended by a general and detained under military authority. 
General James Wilkinson transported him to Washington, DC, ignoring writs of habeas 
corpus issued by judges in New Orleans and Charleston.13  Congress bolstered this process 
                                                          
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 27–72. 
 8. Id. at 40–81. 
 9. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 40–81. 
 10. Id. at 68. 
 11. Id. at 89. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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by suspending habeas for three months and specifically authorizing the imprisonment of 
Bollman and his co-conspirators.14 Bollman then applied to the Supreme Court for a writ 
under the intense scrutiny of Congress, which had just narrowly failed in a highly 
politicized effort to remove Justice Chase through the impeachment process.15 Marshall 
wound up ruling that Congress had indeed authorized the Court to issue writs in these 
circumstances, but for Freedman, the most important and unfortunate part of the ruling 
was Marshall’s dictum.16 In establishing the source of the Court’s authority, Marshall 
denied a broad and inherent power to consider and address wrongful detentions, linking 
the power instead to explicit authorization by Congress.17 
Freedman argues that not until two hundred years later would the Supreme Court 
amend this error in its decision in Boumediene, and as he explains, Boumediene’s legacy 
is uncertain. Boumediene involved claims by prisoners detained in Guantanamo Bay on 
suspicion of involvement with al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations.18 Detained 
indefinitely but not charged with criminal offenses, several filed for habeas relief under 
the modern statute.19 Congress had attempted to foreclose this gambit legislatively by 
withdrawing jurisdiction from the federal courts to hear such claims, but the Court in 2008 
invalidated the non-judicial alternative Congress tried to impose.20 Freedman sees the 
Court’s dicta in this case as equaling the outcome in its importance; however, he notes 
with distress the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Kiyemba v. Obama in 2009 denying relief to 
seventeen Uighur men.21 The government acknowledged it had detained them improperly 
but could not legally transfer them to China because they faced serious risk of persecution 
there. When they applied for habeas relief, the DC Circuit rebuffed them, finding that they 
had no access to habeas relief because the remedy they were seeking would override both 
the tradition of prerogative and the well established executive authority over immigrants.22 
Freedman delves deeply into the historical cases. He does so by mining the records 
of these disputes to provide detailed evidence about the kinds of circumstances that 
provoked judicial intervention to remediate illegitimate state exercises of violence. His 
analysis of court records also supports his argument that our thinking about the early 
history of habeas should include more than just a consideration of the cases in which a 
formal writ was requested through the established process. The richness of his case 
narratives are both a strength and a weakness; the details are fascinating, though at times, 
they threaten to overwhelm the larger points he is making. 
Freedman’s technique of interweaving analysis of the early historical cases with 
critique of modern habeas doctrine highlights what has been lost in the shift to a far more 
statute-bound approach. The early cases are both strange and familiar, giving us a glimpse 
of a world in which courts took a variety of actions to provide functional freedom from 
                                                          
 14. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 90. 
 15. Id. at 90–95. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 92–95. 
 18. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 19. Id. at 723. 
 20. See id. at 723–25. 
 21. See 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 22. Id. at 1029–32. 
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inappropriate state restraint. His call for revitalization is likely to resonate sympathetically 
for the many scholars, lawyers, and activists who expressed concern with the rise of unitary 
executive theory and the general expansion of state power during the series of military 
engagements initiated after September 11. Habeas proved a powerful tool for addressing 
the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, a lever that activists and courts used to pry open the 
dark world of the indefinite, unreviewable, and lawless treatment of enemy detainees 
captured in pursuit of the worldwide military campaign against terrorism. However, as he 
and Kim Lane Scheppele have realized, ringing endorsements of constitutional principle 
have little meaning if they are not used effectively to provide concrete relief to aggrieved 
litigants who attempt to activate them.23 
One down side to Freedman’s analysis is that, in focusing on the early history of 
habeas and bringing it into dialogue with contemporary struggles, he skips over a critical 
period of the writ’s development. While many discussions of habeas in recent years that 
invoke history turn to the American Civil War to compare the use of the writ in a time of 
perceived military emergency, another significant moment in its historical development 
was its use by Chinese immigrants and residents in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Chinese hoping to enter or remain in the United States used habeas to stave off 
denials of entry and deportation orders issued by administrative agencies. Over the period 
between the passage of the first exclusionary federal legislation in the 1870s through the 
1924 National Origins Act, which completely excluded Chinese immigrants, thousands of 
Chinese turned to the legal system, either for themselves or for others, and sought to have 
administrative determinations reversed.24 
This period itself, however, is understood best in the larger context of exclusion. 
Beth Lew-Williams investigates the history of Chinese exclusion between the early 1880s 
and the dawn of the twentieth century.25 Her analysis blends the story of local uses of 
extralegal violence to drive out the Chinese with state and national policy-making efforts, 
showing how vigilantism ultimately provoked a national policy agenda, inviting if not 
demanding that Congress step in to modulate, control, legitimate, and legalize exclusion. 
Lew-Williams presents a developmental perspective that usefully distinguishes between 
different policy periods and highlights the interplay between law and legalization on the 
one hand and extralegal violence on the other. In doing so, she looks both at the 
exclusionists (both state and non-state actors) and the Chinese responses to various 
exclusionary gambits. This dynamic, she argues, would ultimately produce the new legal 
and cultural category of the alien, someone distinguished from earlier migrants.26 
The Chinese first began arriving on American shores in the 1850s, coming in 
primarily as laborers. Lew-Williams notes that the Chinese faced two distinct but 
interrelated forms of resistance. One was a fairly unorganized campaign of harassment and 
violence, often with roots in personal jealousy or loathing, and the other a more 
                                                          
 23. See FREEDMAN, supra note 2; Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Judicial Deference, 92 B.U. L. REV. 89 
(2012). 
 24. See LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN 
IMMIGRATION LAW (1995). 
 25. See LEW-WILLIAMS, supra note 3. 
 26. Id. at 8. 
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coordinated political movement that relied on mobilization, demonstrations, and pressure 
on policymakers as well as violence to try to stem Chinese migration and drive out resident 
Chinese.27 Initially some American political elites like William Seward saw significant 
economic advantages in facilitating the mass migration of Chinese laborers who could be 
relied upon to do the arduous, ill-paid, and low status work of building American railroads, 
peddling vegetables, and engaging in agricultural labor.28 
Nonetheless, popular sentiment in the west against the Chinese made them ready 
targets for legal and extralegal targeting. Initially, state legislatures attempted to stem 
Chinese migration and settlement by legislating against the Chinese, but the Supreme 
Court quickly foreclosed this tack. Lew-Williams shows convincingly that extralegal 
violence against the Chinese then functioned as a political tool to convince Congress to 
act, both because of the highly negative sentiments expressed against the Chinese and as 
a means of maintaining the civil order and removing the incentives for extralegal 
mobilization to drive them out.29 
While white sentiments in the west ran high against the Chinese, these sentiments 
clashed with the growing demand for cheap and docile labor. They also ran afoul of 
important foreign policy objectives as China opened its trading markets and American 
economic elites saw the advantages to be had in working with their Chinese counterparts. 
Popular resistance to Chinese migration, however, created political incentives to engineer 
an exclusionary regime that would function by law. Lew-Williams painstakingly 
reconstructs a list of around 200 actions undertaken on the local level in the west between 
1885 and 1887 primarily in California, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington, to drive the 
Chinese out of communities where they resided.30 While not all involved dangerous 
physical violence, the worst episodes saw multiple deaths.31 The mechanisms for the 
enforcement of an anti-Chinese regime had to be constructed and implemented in a fashion 
to supplant the desire for extralegal enforcement. 
The legal regime of exclusion has received significant scholarly attention.32 
Beginning with the Page Act in 1875 and culminating with the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, 
which set strict quotas for immigration and completed the legal closing of American doors 
to Chinese migration, Congress acted repeatedly and consistently to limit legal entrance 
and continued residence by Chinese. Due to the Supreme Court’s federalization of 
immigration regulation, the states had little constitutional capacity to control or limit 
migration, but some could and did take measures formally and informally to discourage 
Chinese attachment to American land. The Supreme Court allowed the states to legislate 
against Chinese land ownership,33 a practice greatly expanded with the arrival of Japanese 
                                                          
 27. Id. at 19. 
 28. Id. at 25–26. 
 29. Id. at 44–50. 
 30. See LEW-WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 247–52. 
 31. Thirty-four Chinese lost their lives in an expulsion in Hells Canyon Snake River in Oregon, and twenty-
eight in Rock Springs, Wyoming. Id. at 250. 
 32. See, e.g., SALYER, supra note 24; RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY 
OF ASIAN AMERICANS (1998); Julie Novkov & Carol Nackenoff, Civic Membership, Family Status, and the 
Chinese in America, 1870s–1920s, 48 POLITY 165 (2016). 
 33. See Douglas W. Nelson, The Alien Land Law Movement of the Late Nineteenth Century, 9 J. OF THE WEST 
46–59 (1970). 
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immigrants in the early twentieth century.34 Yet overarching control and management of 
immigrant entry and management of access to rights and citizenship were quickly claimed 
as the exclusive province of the national government. Lew-Williams shows how the 
Supreme Court’s insistence that only Congress had the regulatory authority to manage 
these questions led to the mobilization of private violence, which then served as a political 
tool to extract vigorous congressional intervention.35 
Lew-Williams’ account fills the significant scholarly gap between the policy 
struggles taking place among state actors, primarily between the federal courts and newly 
empowered administrative agencies, and the struggles taking place on the ground between 
individuals promoting and enforcing exclusion and the Chinese themselves. She highlights 
the importance of regional interests and tensions, as internationalists and promoters of 
commercial development in the east locked horns with xenophobes and labor 
protectionists in the west. Her analysis helps to make sense of the mounting frustration 
among exclusionists, who could see clearly that policymaking from the top, even when it 
did take their demands into account, did not result in the creation of sufficient state 
capacity on the ground to meet their expectations. For instance, Lew-Williams describes 
how the highly ambiguous and porous system of restriction on Chinese migration initially 
implemented in Washington State provided incendiary fuel for the outbreaks of vigilante 
violence and enforcement shortly thereafter.36 This early episode saw echoes after a series 
of efforts to reform the immigration system and close American ports to mass Chinese 
migration; 
Lew-Williams’ work to recover the voices and perspectives of the Chinese, however, 
distinguishes the book. Painstakingly working through records of the era, she finds 
substantial evidence of how the Chinese responded to exclusionary efforts by migrating – 
at times back to China, but often remaining within the United States but simply moving to 
areas where neither vigilantism nor formal governmental action would pose as much of a 
threat.37 This history of internal migration provides additional nuance in our 
understandings of responses to threats of coercive state and non-state power when the 
threatened individuals had only uncertain assurances of legal checks on the process. 
CONCLUSION 
Both Freedman and Lew-Williams recognize the importance of law, courts, and 
habeas in addressing situations in which the government has incentives to exercise 
violence against individuals who do not have access to the standard package of rights 
recognition accompanying full citizenship.  Both carefully consider historical struggles to 
contain, channel, and legitimate state violence. Their readings acknowledge that while 
courts sometimes provide the independent institutional space to consider the legitimate 
exercise of state violence, the courts themselves, whether they check or allow state 
violence, serve a legitimating function. Both remind us forcefully as well that too much 
                                                          
 34. Roger Daniels, Asian Americans: Rights Denied and Attained, in TWO CULTURES OF RIGHTS: THE QUEST 
FOR INCLUSION AND PARTICIPATION IN MODERN AMERICA AND GERMANY 19–33 (Berg & Geyer eds. 2002). 
 35. See LEW-WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 44. 
 36. Id. at 53–55. 
 37. Id. at 53–90. 
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attention to the doctrinal rules courts produce may blind us to the real pain and violence 
experienced by the denizens of law’s empire – pain and violence that, in Lew-Williams’ 
analysis, need not even be imposed by the state to serve the state’s interests. 
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